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REVISITING A CLASSIC PROBLEM IN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: IS A MINISTER
A LABORER?
Tammy Gales* & Lawrence M. Solan**
ABSTRACT
This study presents a new analysis of an iconic United States
Supreme Court case, Holy Trinity Church v. United States (1892). The
question in Holy Trinity Church concerned whether a law making it
illegal to pay the transportation of a person entering the U.S. under
contract to perform “labor or service of any kind” applied to a wealthy
Manhattan church that had paid to bring its new rector from England
to New York. The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the law did
not apply to the church’s contract, relying first on the ordinary
meaning of “labor” and second on the legislative history of the single
construction “labor or service.”
Highlighting the use of corpus linguistic methods, this study tests
the arguments presented by the Court and reveals new insights through
an analysis of historic and contemporary reference corpora and a
specialized corpus of U.S. statutes. The results demonstrate that the
disjunctive phrase “labor or service” appeared to be a legal term of art
with narrow interpretation that would exclude clergy, but around the
time of Holy Trinity Church, slight variations on the phrase (e.g.,
pluralization, conjunction, and modification) applied to contexts with
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broader meaning. When examining “labor” as an independent term,
those who labored were generally not clergy and the description of the
activities of clergy was typically not described as labor, although
examination evidenced instances of both. The findings demonstrate
the importance of consulting corpora in the evaluation of statutory and
ordinary meaning and considering the sociohistorical contexts in
which it occurs.
INTRODUCTION
Our goal in this article is to demonstrate how the use of linguistic
corpora in historical cases—when used with proper caution—can add
significantly to conventional tools of statutory interpretation,
especially in cases in which meaning may have changed over time. In
doing so, we use the methods described by Lee and Mouritsen1 as a
springboard to make new contributions to the study of Holy Trinity
Church v. United States2—perhaps the most studied United States case
engaging methods of statutory interpretation.
Holy Trinity Church concerned whether a law making it illegal to
pay the transportation of a person entering the U.S. under a contract
“to perform labor or service of any kind” applied to a wealthy
Manhattan church that paid to bring its new rector from London to
New York.3 In 1892, the Supreme Court decided the answer to the
issue was no.4 Justice Brewer’s opinion for a unanimous Court relied,
as its first argument, on the Justices’ sense of the typical use of the
relevant language.5
Because of its two later arguments, relying on legislative history to
respond to the fact that the list of exceptions did not include members
of the clergy6 and recognizing that Congress—knowing that the U.S.
1. Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788, 788
(2018).
2. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
3. Id. at 457–58.
4. Id. at 459.
5. Id. at 463.
6. Id. at 464–65.
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was founded as a Christian nation—would be unlikely to have
intended to impede religion so aggressively,7 the case has received
great attention and continues to provoke debate as it rumbles through
its second century.8 The fact that the first main argument is about
ordinary meaning, a conventional argument at that, is sometimes lost
in the literature.
The facts are as follows. In 1885, Congress passed the Alien
Contract Labor Law.9 Section 1 contained the main provision:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, company, partnership,
or corporation, in any manner whatsoever, to prepay the
transportation, or in any way assist or encourage the
importation or migration of any alien or aliens, any foreigner
or foreigners, into the United States, its Territories, or the
District of Columbia, under contract or agreement, parol or
special, express or implied, made previous to the importation
or migration of such alien or aliens, foreigner or foreigners,
to perform labor or service of any kind in the United States,
its Territories, or the District of Columbia.10
Section 5 listed exceptions:
[N]or shall this act be so construed as to prevent any person,
or persons, partnership, or corporation from engaging, under
contract or agreement, skilled workman in foreign countries
to perform labor in the United States in or upon any new
industry not at present established in the United States:
Provided, That skilled labor for that purpose cannot be
otherwise obtained; nor shall the provisions of this act apply
to professional actors, artists, lecturers, or singers, nor to
7. Id. at 465–72.
8. Compare Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History in
Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 911–16 (2000), with Adrian Vermeule, Legislative
History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1833, 1835–37 (1998), and ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 18–23 (1998).
9. Alien Contract Labor Law of 1885, ch. 164, § 1, 23 Stat. 332, 332 (amended 1887, 1888).
10. Id.
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persons employed strictly as personal or domestic servants:
Provided, That nothing in this act shall be construed as
prohibiting any individual from assisting any member of his
family or any relative or personal friend, to migrate from any
foreign country to the United States, for the purpose of
settlement here.11
In 1891, Congress added “ministers of any religious
denomination, . . . persons belonging to any recognized profession,”
and “professors for colleges and seminaries” to the list of exceptions.12
But that was too late for Manhattan’s Church of the Holy Trinity and
the minister it hired from London under contract, the Reverend Doctor
Edward Walpole Warren.13 The district court had already prosecuted
and fined the church for violating the law in 1888.14
The church appealed to the Supreme Court, which ruled
unanimously that the law did not apply to the church’s contract with
its new clergyman. The Court first articulated this often-quoted
statement about the interpretation of statutes:
It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its
spirit nor within the intention of its makers. This has been
often asserted, and the Reports are full of cases illustrating
its application. This is not the substitution of the will of the
judge for that of the legislator; for frequently words of
general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough
to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of the
whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its
enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving
such broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to

11. Id. § 5, 23 Stat. at 333.
12. See Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, § 5, 26 Stat. 1084, 1085.
13. See United States v. Church of the Holy Trinity, 36 F. 303, 303–04 (S.D.N.Y. 1888), rev’d, 143
U.S. 457 (1892).
14. Id. There is contemporaneous evidence supporting a claim that the church brought the case
collusively in an effort to have the law declared unconstitutional. See Chomsky, supra note 8, at 910–16.
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believe that the legislator intended to include the particular
act.15
Though Brewer’s reference to the “spirit” of the law may strike a
discordant note to the modern ear,16 recognizing that laws might be
drafted in language broader than that needed to serve their purpose
stems back to Aristotle,17 and dealing with that reality remains a matter
of considerable disagreement among judges and scholars today.18
The Court moved on to employ the ordinary meaning canon as its
first interpretive argument:
The common understanding of the terms “labor” and
“laborers” does not include preaching and preachers, and it
is to be assumed that words and phrases are used in their
ordinary meaning. So whatever of light is thrown upon the
statute by the language of the title indicates an exclusion
from its penal provisions of all contracts for the employment
of ministers, rectors, and pastors.19
Yet, the Court recognized that the language of the statute was
susceptible to an interpretation that extended beyond the evil that the
statute was enacted to address, as had the enacting Congress.20 Not
only was the term “labor or service of any kind” open to a broad
interpretation (although such an interpretation would not have been
preferred), but the list of exceptions then in effect also did not include
members of the clergy.21 The canon expressio unius est exlusio alterius
dictates that the passage of what appears to be a complete list of

15. Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 459.
16. SCALIA, supra note 8, at 18–22.
17. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 174–76 (F. H. Peters trans., Kegan Paul, Trench,
Trübner & Co. 5th ed. 1893) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
18. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015).
19. Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 463.
20. 15 CONG. REC. 6057 (1884).
21. But see infra note 77 and accompanying text for arguments that “lecturers” included members of
the clergy, which is within the list of named exceptions.
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exceptions implies that items not listed are not exceptions.22 Unable to
modify the bill without jeopardizing passage in the current session, the
Senate Report predicted—as Justice Brewer noted—that the courts
would not construe the statute more broadly than required to combat
the evil that Congress enacted the law to address.23 The Court thus
reversed the conviction unanimously.
I. Corpus Linguistic Analysis in Legal Interpretation
Fast forward 125 years. A number of legal scholars and judges have
been collaborating with linguists to employ methods of corpus
linguistics in the service of statutory and constitutional interpretation.
The principal goal is to use big data that is representative of a particular
variety of language as a source of information about ordinary meaning
in the realm of statutes and original public meaning in constitutional
argument. Among other things, this partnership has produced a
symposium in the BYU Law Review,24 a number of amicus briefs filed
in U.S. Supreme Court cases, and a 2018 article in the Yale Law
Journal by Thomas C. Lee and Stephen R. Mouritsen, Judging
Ordinary Meaning.25 Lee is Associate Chief Justice of the Utah
Supreme Court and a former full-time member of the Brigham Young
University law faculty.26 Mouritsen is Lee’s former student and law
clerk and is trained in the methods of corpus linguistics.27
The principal argument has been one of drawing inferences of
ordinary meaning based upon the relative frequency of one usage over
another with respect to a disputed term. For example, in Costello v.
United States,28 Judge Posner, using Google News, determined that the

22. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND
THE CONSTITUTION 408 (2016) (discussing this canon from different interpretative perspectives); see also

ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 107–11
(2012).
23. Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 464–65.
24. Symposium, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1297 (2018).
25. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 789.
26. See generally id.
27. Id.
28. See generally United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. 2012).
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verb “to harbor,” when used with a human object, generally implies an
effort to hide an individual, such as harboring Jews from the Nazis.29
He thus held that a woman living with her undocumented boyfriend
did not “harbor” him in violation of a federal statute, absent evidence
that she attempted to help hide him from the authorities.30 And Justice
Lee has used corpus analysis in a number of cases, most notably State
v. Rasabout,31 in which, in a concurring opinion, he used Brigham
Young’s Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA)32 to
determine that a gang member who fired twelve shots in a drive-by
shooting actually “discharged” his gun twelve times, based on the
corpus’s showing that “discharge” in the context of weapons is almost
exclusively used to describe individual shots, rather than emptying
one’s weapon of its ammunition entirely.33 Other courts have followed
suit, employing one or another version of corpus linguistic analysis,
although at times with considerable controversy within the courts.34
It should not be surprising that the legal community is turning to big
data to determine ordinary linguistic usage. Accustomed to using
databases such as Lexis and Westlaw, legal analysts conduct a kind of
corpus analysis in their own right when they comb big data to
determine how language is used in particular contexts. To take one
well-studied case as an example, in West Virginia University Hospitals
v. Casey,35 the issue was whether a law awarding “a reasonable
attorney’s fee” to victorious civil rights litigants included the recovery
of expert witness costs that the lawyers incurred.36 The expression is
ambiguous. A reasonable attorney’s fee can mean a reasonable fee for
the time spent by the attorney, excluding disbursements that the
attorney makes for other litigation services, or it can refer to the
29. Id. at 1044.
30. Id. at 1050.
31. State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1264 (Utah 2015).
32. Id. at 1277 (referencing COCA, which is available at https://www.english-corpora.org/coca/).
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Wilson v. Safelite Grp., Inc., 930 F.3d 429, 440 (6th Cir. 2019) (detailing disagreement
among judges about appropriateness of corpus linguistic methods); People v. Harris, 855 N.W.2d 832,
838–39 (Mich. 2016) (exhibiting disagreement among justices about the appropriate search to conduct).
35. See generally W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
36. Id. at 84.
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amount that the attorney bills the client, including such costs as
disbursements for expert witnesses and other things.37 In holding that
the statute does not cover the recovery of expert witness fees, Justice
Scalia, writing for a majority of six, turned to the language used in
federal statutes that call for the recovery of attorney’s fees.38 The Court
found:
The record of statutory usage demonstrates convincingly
that attorney’s fees and expert fees are regarded as separate
elements of litigation cost. While some fee-shifting
provisions, like § 1988, refer only to “attorney’s fees,” see,
e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k),
many others explicitly shift expert witness fees as well as
attorney’s fees.39
Thus, by searching the United States Code, and demonstrating that
Congress often specifies the inclusion of expert fees when it wants to
make sure that they are recoverable, the Court supported its argument
that the absence of such specification reasonably implies a lack of
commitment to the recovery of expert fees.40
In earlier work, we looked at corpus linguistic analysis of statutory
cases with a critical eye while attempting to describe the conditions
under which it is likely to be efficacious.41 We observed that corpus
analysis is most useful when (a) the task is to discover the ordinary
meaning of a statutory term; (b) the understanding of “ordinary
meaning” is resolved; (c) there is agreement about the appropriate
search to conduct and in which corpora to conduct it; and
(d) inferences drawn from the absence of particular meanings from a
corpus are not excessive.

37. Id. at 106–07.
38. Id. at 86–90.
39. Id. at 88.
40. Id. at 92.
41. Lawrence M. Solan & Tammy Gales, Corpus Linguistics as a Tool in Legal Interpretation, 2017
BYU L. REV. 1311, 1313–16 (2018).
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As an initial matter, whether the ordinary meaning of a term in
dispute should carry the day is a legal question. Courts indeed
frequently default to the ordinary understanding of statutory terms.42
In many cases, however, the Supreme Court has determined from the
context of the law’s enactment that the legislature intended a meaning
either narrower or broader than the statutory term’s ordinary usage
would dictate.43 Moreover, many statutory terms have particular legal
meanings even if they also have ordinary, nontechnical meanings.
Sometimes, these senses overlap, creating difficult interpretive
problems and difficult decisions for the corpus linguist as to which
corpus, if any, to use in the analysis.44
Second, as Lee and Mouritsen document,45 the Supreme Court does
not have a uniform concept of ordinary meaning.46 In Holy Trinity
Church v. United States, the principal subject of this article, frequency
of usage appears to carry the day, whereas in McBoyle v. United
States,47 in which the Supreme Court unanimously held that a stolen
airplane does not come within the meaning of “vehicle” for purposes
of construing the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, Justice Holmes
relied on the image that first comes to mind upon hearing the term.48
Recent work by Kevin Tobia argues persuasively that corpus linguistic
analysis is especially adept at identifying prototypical usage of a
term.49 Psychologists argue that we base our sense of what is
prototypical more on what has the essential features of the concept at

42. See ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 22, at 42; see also LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF
STATUTES 53 (2010). See generally BRIAN G. SLOCUM, ORDINARY MEANING: A THEORY OF THE MOST
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2015).
43. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1077 (2015) (finding a narrower than ordinary meaning
applied); Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 858 (2014) (finding a narrower than ordinary meaning
applied); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400 (1991) (finding a broader than ordinary meaning applied).
See generally Solan & Gales, supra note 41 (discussing these and similar cases).
44. Evan C. Zoldan, Corpus Linguistics and the Dream of Objectivity, 50 SETON HALL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020).
45. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 798.
46. SLOCUM, supra note 42, at 81; see Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 798.
47. See generally McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931).
48. Id. at 26.
49. Kevin P. Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning: An Experimental Assessment of What Dictionary
Definitions and Linguistic Usage Data Tell Legal Interpreters, 133 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
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hand than on central tendency.50 The giraffe is the prototypical tall
animal because it is exaggeratedly tall, not because we see more
giraffes than, say, camels.51
Third, a similar issue arises from time to time over what search is
appropriate once one decides that a corpus may be helpful in principle.
In one Supreme Court case, Muscarello v. United States,52 Justice
Breyer wrote for the majority that a particular meaning of the word
“carry” was ordinary in part because one-third of usages in a corpus of
news articles conveyed the same meaning.53 The issue was whether the
defendant’s having a gun in his car as he drove to a drug crime
constituted “carrying . . . a firearm” under the relevant statute.54
Breyer searched news articles that contained the words “carry,”
“weapon,” and “vehicle” (and synonyms of them).55 As Mouritsen
points out, however, by including the word “vehicle” in the search,
Breyer preordained the result.56 Instead, he should have searched
“weapon” and “carry” (and their synonyms) occurring in close
proximity, and then determined the extent to which “carry” in that
context meant carrying the weapon in a vehicle.57 Mouritsen did so
using COCA and found that carrying a weapon in a vehicle defined the
context only one-sixth as often as did carrying a weapon on one’s
person.58
Fourth, as noted above, it is not enough to observe that one meaning
in a corpus predominates over another. We call this the “blue pitta”
problem. The blue pitta is a bird of Asia, not mentioned at all in
COCA.59 Is it any less a bird for that reason? Of course not. A law
prohibiting the killing of birds in a nature reserve would certainly not
50. Elizabeth B. Lynch et al., Tall Is Typical: Central Tendency, Ideal Dimensions & Graded Category
Structure Among Tree Experts & Novices, 28 MEMORY & COGNITION 41, 41 (2000).
51. Id.
52. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
53. Id. at 131.
54. Id. at 127.
55. Id. at 131.
56. Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a
Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915, 1946–48.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1960–61.
59. Solan & Gales, supra note 41, at 1315.
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exempt the killing of bird species that are not spoken of often. On the
contrary, if anything, rare birds would be more highly valued.
Americans do not talk much about blue pittas, but that has nothing to
do with their membership in the category bird.
Consider Smith v. United States,60 a predecessor to Muscarello, in
which a divided Supreme Court held that the defendant had used a
firearm in a drug trafficking crime when he attempted to trade his
unloaded machine gun for cocaine.61 Justice Scalia wrote a strong
dissent, arguing that when one thinks of using a gun, one thinks of
using it as a weapon, not as a thing of value.62 A corpus search shows
that he was right: when people speak of using a gun, they speak of
using it as a weapon. To make his argument stronger, however, we
suggest Scalia might have also shown that people indeed speak of
exchanging a weapon for something of value, but when they do so they
use words other than “use,” such as “exchange” or “trade.” Our own
search of COCA shows that this is indeed the case.63 We have made
similar suggestions with respect to other cases that have been
subjected to corpus analysis.64
Historical cases, such as the one discussed in this article, require us
to focus on a fifth issue: the importance of deciding which corpora to
consult. In many cases, especially historical ones, that decision often
requires consulting more than one corpus. We will see that even
corpora that are structured to balance data from various genres are
selective in the examples they include. The fact that these corpora are
intended to be understood in their ordinary sense becomes nonobvious
when the terms in the disputed law can be understood alternatively as
either (1) ordinary language or (2) as language that has a history of
interpretation within legal discourse.65
60. See generally Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
61. Id. at 241.
62. Id. at 245.
63. See Corpus of Contemporary American English, ENGLISH-CORPORA.ORG, https://www.englishcorpora.org/coca/ [https://perma.cc/8Q4P-XNYY] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019) [hereinafter COCA]. On
February 6, 2019, the authors searched “weapon” co-occurring with synonyms of “exchange.” Leading
collocates were “trade” and “switch”; “use” did not occur.
64. Solan & Gales, supra note 41, at 1354–56 (discussing State v. Rasabout).
65. Frederick Schauer, On the Relationship Between Legal and Ordinary Language, in SPEAKING OF

Published by Reading Room,

11

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 5 [], Art. 7

502

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:Spec. Issue

II. Our Method
Below, we provide findings from corpus linguistic analyses that
investigate the language of the Alien Contract Labor Law at issue in
Holy Trinity Church. In conducting the analyses, we employ a number
of different corpora and corpus tools that allow us to trace the meaning
of “labor or service” in statutory and ordinary meaning over time. In
particular, we consulted and used:
•

•

•

United States Statutes at Large (USSL)
This specialized statutory corpus66 contains 835,743
words from 131 statutes from the years 1789–2008 that
use (or refer to) the words “labor”67 and “service.” We
used AntConc, a software program designed for corpus
analysis, for the analysis.68
The Corpus of Historical American English
(COHA)
This corpus contains more than 400 million words of
written texts (fiction, magazines, newspaper articles, and
nonfiction books) equally divided by decade from 1810–
2010.69
The Corpus of Contemporary American English
(COCA)

LANGUAGE AND LAW: CONVERSATIONS ON THE WORK OF PETER TIERSMA 35, 35–36 (Lawrence M. Solan
et al. eds., 2015). See generally Zoldan, supra note 44.
66. Corpus linguists distinguish between general (or reference) corpora and specialized corpora in
terms of representativeness, balance, and design. The U.S. Statutes at Large (USSL) is a specialized
corpus we compiled within this rubric. Tammy Gales & Lawrence M. Solan, U.S. Statutes at Large
(unpublished corpus) (on file with authors) [hereinafter USSL].
67. Searches included the spelling variant “labour”.
68. U.S. Statutes at Large, HEINONLINE, https://home.heinonline.org/content/u-s-statutes-at-large/
[https://perma.cc/2YV6-ZCW8] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019). Statutes were collected from the HeinOnline
database with the much-appreciated help of our research assistants. Files were converted into “.txt” files
and the analysis was performed with AntConc. AntConc, LAURENCE ANTHONY’S WEBSITE,
http://www.laurenceanthony.net/software/antconc/ [https://perma.cc/2D66-NTPC] (last visited Nov. 7,
2019).
69. See CORPUS HIST. AM. ENG., https://www.english-corpora.org/coha/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2019)
[hereinafter COHA].
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This corpus is comprised of 560 million words from
1990–2017 and is balanced, i.e., equally divided, across
five registers: spoken, fiction, magazines, newspapers,
and academic texts. 70
Google Books Ngram Viewer
The Ngram viewer function of Google Books allows
users to search for words or phrases within millions of
books in the Google collection (both copyrighted and
out-of-copyright publications of books, reports, and
documents).71 The results are displayed in a graph
showing usage over time, and examples from each time
period can be viewed individually within those time
periods.72

As with all corpus analyses, there are limitations. First, the results
can only reflect the data represented in the corpora analyzed. Some of
the following analyses investigated large, publicly available reference
corpora (COCA and COHA), which contain language from a range of
mostly written registers—newspapers, academic texts, magazines, and
fiction books. As we discuss below, examinations of more specialized
texts, such as statutes in USSL and nonfiction books in Google’s
Ngram Viewer, provided additional insights into the uses of each term
or phrase in question.73 This point is especially important when
conducting legal analysis since Brigham Young University’s large
reference corpora do not include legal documents as an independent
category and tend to contain very few legal documents in general.74
Second, the search features used here are not meant to be indicative
of the full range of ways to search corpora; creating additional
70. COCA, supra note 63.
71. Ngram Viewer, GOOGLE BOOKS, https://books.google.com/ngrams [https://perma.cc/9Q9TRR8V] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).
72. Id. Because Google preselects the time periods, those in the analysis below may not match the
exact time periods selected for investigation in the BYU corpora. Id. The closest overlap of decades was
chosen for use in the analysis. Id.
73. See infra Part III.
74. See
generally
Overview,
BYU
CORPORA,
https://corpus.byu.edu/overview.asp
[https://perma.cc/S47V-XNT9] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).
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specialized corpora, using other corpus software tools,75 and
performing searches using regular expressions or different statistical
measures may allow for a wider range of results.76
That said, our findings support the Court’s conclusion, at least to the
extent that it was based on how the language contained in the statute
was actually used in the nineteenth century both in ordinary usage and
in statutes. Specifically, when people spoke of what the clergy did,
they rarely used the word “labor,” and when they used the word
“labor,” they generally did so to describe manual labor, not something
typically performed by clergy. Thus, “labor” and “clergy” were doubly
dissociated. Furthermore, in both the Constitution and in earlier
statutes, the compound phrase “labor or service” was used as an
expression to mean the work of slaves—not the tasks of the clergy. As
for the list of exceptions, to which we will return, one exception was
for “lecturers.” In the nineteenth century, one meaning of that word
was a junior member of the clergy in the Church of England.77 Thus,
it should not be too surprising that the Congress that enacted this law
recognized that it might be construed more broadly than the problem
it was intending to address, but at the same time had confidence that
the courts would exercise sufficient wisdom to construe the law
consistent with its goals.78

75. See,
e.g.,
WordSmith
Tools,
LEXICAL
ANALYSIS
SOFTWARE
LTD.,
https://www.lexically.net/wordsmith/ [https://perma.cc/6E6M-WYR9] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).
76. See generally Symposium, James C. Phillips & Jesse Egbert, A Concise How-to-Guide for Law
and Corpus Linguistics: Importing Principles and Practices from Survey and Content-Analysis
Methodologies to Improve Corpus Design and Analysis, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1589 (2018) (providing a
more thorough discussion of the compilation and selection of corpora and the use of corpus tools in legal
analyses).
77. Lecturer, THE OXFORD CONCISE DICTIONARY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH (Elizabeth A.
Livingstone ed., 3d ed. 2014) (1977). The Oxford Concise Dictionary of the Christian Church contains
the following definition of “lecturers”: “Stipendiary ministers (often deacons), appointed in the century
after 1559 by town corporations, parishes, and occasionally by individual laymen, to provide regular
frequent
preaching.”
Id.;
see
also
Lecturer
(clergy),
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lecturer_(clergy) [https://perma.cc/KYR4-W9G8] (last edited Sept. 30,
2019). Our gratitude to William Eskridge for bringing this fact to our attention.
78. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 465 (1892).
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III. Does the Alien Contract Labor Law Reflect Ordinary Language
or Is It a Legal Term of Art?
A. “Labor or Service” in Statutory Language
This case presents a problem not addressed by the Court. The term
“labor or service” may not be a matter of ordinary meaning at all but
may rather be a legal term of art used to describe the work of slaves.
Article IV of the Constitution contains the following language:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the
Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence
of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such
Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of
the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.79
Similarly, both the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 and the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1850 contain precisely this expression.80 The 1793 Act
required:
And be it also enacted, That when a person held to labour in
any of the United States, or in either of the Territories on the
Northwest or South of the river Ohio, under the laws thereof,
shall escape into any other part of the said States or Territory,
the person to whom such labour or service may be due, his
agent or attorney, is hereby empowered to seize or arrest
such fugitive from labour, and to take him or her before any
Judge of the Circuit or District Courts of the United
States . . . .81

79. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (emphasis added).
80. Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, § 3, 1 Stat. 302, 302–03 (repealed 1864); Fugitive Slave Act of
1850, ch. 60, § 6, 9 Stat. 462, 463 (repealed 1864).
81. § 3, 1 Stat. at 302–03 (emphasis added).
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It is worth noting that this statute sometimes uses the expression
“service or labor” and at other times refers only to “labor.”82 We see
the same linguistic decision made by the Supreme Court in Holy
Trinity Church, which focuses on the bald word “labor,” and
emphasizes that the title of the statute contains the word “labor” but
not the word “service” as justification for this analytical move.83
Similarly, the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act contained the following
language:
And be it further enacted, That when a person held to service
or labor in any State or Territory of the United States, has
heretofore or shall hereafter escape into another State or
Territory of the United States, the person or persons to whom
such service or labor may be due . . . may pursue and
reclaim such fugitive person, either by procuring a warrant
from some of the courts, judges or commissioners
aforesaid, . . . for the apprehension of such fugitive from
service or labor, or by seizing and arresting such fugitive,
where the same can be done without process, and by taking
or causing such person to be taken, forthwith before such
court, judge or commissioner . . . ; and upon satisfactory
proof being made, . . . to use such reasonable force and
restraint as may be necessary, under the circumstances of the
case, to take and remove such fugitive person back to the
State or Territory whence he or she may have escaped as
aforesaid. In no trial or hearing under this act shall the
testimony of such alleged fugitive be admitted in
evidence . . . .84
This language continues in usage today, although “service” has been
replaced by “services” in statutory language. For example, the federal
statute currently barring forced labor says:

82. Id.
83. Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 458–59.
84. § 6, 9 Stat. at 463 (emphasis added).
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Whoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or
services of a person by any one of, or by any combination
of, the following means—
(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical
restraint, or threats of physical restraint to that person
or another person;
(2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm
to that person or another person;
(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or
legal process; or
(4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended
to cause the person to believe that, if that person did not
perform such labor or services, that person or another
person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint,
shall be punished as provided under subsection (d).85
The expression likely was recognized as a euphemism because the
Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery, speaks of “slavery”
or “involuntary servitude” directly.86
With these historically salient examples in mind, we determined to
search the entire body of USSL to determine whether the words “labor
or service” (in either order) were routinely used to refer to the type of
manual labor that slaves engaged in, or whether the words, when used
disjunctively as in the statutes, typically suggested a broader
connotation.
In USSL, “labor”87 occurred a total of 783 times and “service” a
total of 1,903 times.88 The phrase “labor or service” occurred fifty-one
times in nineteen statutes from 1789 to 1986.
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2018) (emphasis added).
86. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.”).
87. See generally USSL, supra note 66 (including “labour”). Search: “labo*r”.
88. See generally id. Due to the age of some of the statutes, variations on spellings, line breaks, and
character fonts caused some inconsistencies in the file conversion process. Id. Given the low frequencies
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When examining the statutory language in context, fairly clear
patterns of use over time can be traced:
1. 1789–1863: Slaves, indentured servants, or those who
perform forced manual labor.
• 1 Stat. 53 (1789): Provided always, that any person
escaping into the same, from whom labour or
service is lawfully claimed in any one of the original
States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed, and
conveyed to the person claiming his or her labour or
service as aforesaid.89
2. 1881–1907: Aliens, foreigners, and contract day laborers
who perform manual (forced or temporary low-paid) labor.
• 34 Stat. 898 (1902): That for every violation of any
of the provisions of section four of this Act the
persons, partnership, company, or corporation
violating the same, by knowingly assisting,
encouraging, or soliciting the migration or
importation of any contract laborer into the United
States shall forfeit and pay for every such offense the
sum of one thousand dollars, which may be sued for
and recovered by the United States, or by any person
who shall first bring his action therefor in his own
name and for his own benefit, including any such
alien thus promised labor or service of any kind as
aforesaid, as debts of like amount are now recovered
in the courts of the United States;
3. 1925–present: Workers or employees who perform
voluntary manual, paid labor.
of these occurrences, hand-correcting was not performed for these searches. For example, the following
variations due to odd line breaks were not included: “labo” = 4, “labora” = 9, “labore” = 1 and “servi” =
1, “servic” = 3. Id. However, for more concise results, hand-correcting for conversion errors is
recommended. Id.
89. Minor corrections were made to the corpus examples (e.g., removing hyphens from original line
breaks and page numbers that were inserted into the text due to OCR conversion); however, the remainder
of the text examples are presented verbatim from the original source. Bolding has been added for
emphasis.
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54 Stat. 348 (1936): Any officer or agent of the
United States whose duty it shall be to employ,
direct, or control any person employed in connection
with the operation or maintenance of such railroad
who shall intentionally require or permit such person
to be employed for hours of labor or service in
violation of this Act shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor . . . .

While the kinds of labor referred to in each of the statutory periods
outlined above relate primarily to some kind of manual labor, the status
of the participants performing such duties changed over time. Statutes
in the earlier time period referred to the work performed by slaves or
those who were indentured to others to perform such work. During the
second period, there was a shift to manual laborers who performed
usually low-paid contracted work. Finally, with the Railway Labor Act
of 1926, statutes began to refer to “employees” and specialized
technical positions such as “mechanics,” as well as workers who were
able to “quit” if they desired. Examining the phrase in its reverse
order—“service or labor”—resulted in similar frequencies (i.e.,
fifty-four total instances in thirty-two statutes from 1789–2008) and
changes in meaning over time.90
With respect to the first two of these periods, which cover the
nineteenth century period relevant here, these facts raise an important
linguistic question: whether the meaning of “labor or service” should
be taken as a single construction or whether the terms are
compositional, and should be examined separately according to their
individual contribution to the meaning of the whole phrase. Linguist
Adele Goldberg has focused on the extent to which language contains
constructions that must be learned individually by children learning
their native tongue.91 Linguist Ray Jackendoff has argued that there is

90. See generally USSL, supra note 66.
91. See generally ADELE E. GOLDBERG, CONSTRUCTIONS: A CONSTRUCTION GRAMMAR APPROACH
TO ARGUMENT STRUCTURE (1995).
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a continuum between the two in natural language.92 Examples of
expressions as constructions include such idiomatic expressions as
“hand over fist,” “head over heels,” “hand in glove,” “tongue in
cheek,” and “hand to mouth.”93 The meanings of these expressions are
not the sum of their parts.94 In contrast, language is most often
compositional.95 A red truck is a truck that is red. When a menu says
“soup or salad” it means soup or salad as a disjunctive phrase. The
language at issue in Holy Trinity Church lands somewhere in the
middle of this continuum. It can be understood as either a construction
or as compositional. Samuel L. Bray has argued that certain clauses
found in the Constitution, including “necessary and proper” and “cruel
and unusual,” are actually constructions and should not be analyzed as
compositional expressions.96
It is not likely to be an accident that the statute at issue uses the
language that traditionally describes the work of slaves in legal
documents. Yet the historical facts suggest that Congress did not
intend to limit the scope of the statute so aggressively. First, the statute
speaks of “labor or service of any kind.”97 This modification suggests
a broad interpretation. However, if “labor or service” is understood as
a single construction meaning “slave-like work,” then the entire phrase
means nothing more than slave-like work of any kind. The legislative
history does not discuss the expression in these terms,98 but the
historical use of this verbiage should nonetheless be taken seriously.

92. Ray Jackendoff, ‘Construction After Construction’ and Its Theoretical Challenges, 84 LANGUAGE
8, 8 (2008). Constructions are typically inflexible when it comes to order (“hook, line and sinker,” not
“sinker, line and hook”). Id. Thus, the language under discussion is not a prototypical construction. Id.
93. Id. at 8–9.
94. Id.
95. See generally JERRY A. FODOR & ERNEST LEPORE, THE COMPOSITIONALITY PAPERS (2002);
PAULINE JACOBSON, COMPOSITIONAL SEMANTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SYNTACTIC/SEMANTIC
INTERFACE (2014).
96. Samuel L. Bray, ‘Necessary AND Proper’ and ‘Cruel AND Unusual’: Hendiadys in the
Constitution, 102 VA. L. REV. 687, 693 n.33 (2016).
97. Alien Contract Labor Law of 1885, ch. 164, § 1, 23 Stat. 332, 332 (amended 1887, 1888).
98. See Chomsky, supra note 8; Vermeule, supra note 8. We are grateful to Timothy Lytton and Julian
Davis Mortenson for bringing to our attention the uncertainty of the psychological state of Congress with
respect to this issue.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss5/7

20

Gales and Solan: Statutory Interpretation, Supreme Court, Labor

2020]

REVISITING A CLASSIC PROBLEM

511

Second, as Adrian Vermeule emphasizes, the exceptions in the
statute go beyond slave-like manual labor.99 If Congress so limited the
statute in the first place, there would be no need to have listed these
exceptions.
The Court was well aware of these arguments and acknowledged
them early in the opinion:
It must be conceded that the act of the corporation is within
the letter of this section, for the relation of rector to his
church is one of service, and implies labor on the one side
with compensation on the other. Not only are the general
words “labor” and “service” both used, but also, as it were
to guard against any narrow interpretation and emphasize a
breadth of meaning, to them is added “of any kind;” and,
further, as noticed by the circuit judge in his opinion, the
fifth section, which makes specific exceptions, among them
professional actors, artists, lecturers, singers, and domestic
servants, strengthens the idea that every other kind of labor
and service was intended to be reached by the first section.100
Yet the Court determined that the purpose of the statute, the fact that
the title of the statute mentioned only “labor,” and the ordinary
meaning of “labor” outmatched the arguments to the contrary.101
Of note are variants on the phrase “labor or service” (in either order)
and on the application of the term “labor” that begin to appear in USSL
around 1910 and increase steadily from 1926 onward—around the
time of the Railway Labor Act. For example, the phrase is pluralized
(e.g., “labor or services”), conjoined (“labor and service(s)”), and
increasingly modified over time to refer to a broader range of workers
(e.g., “labor” that is: “alien,” “contract,” “convict,” “railway,”
“agricultural,” “day,” “farm,” “mechanical,” “skilled,” “unskilled,”
and “temporary”). Statutes using such language generally referred to
99. See Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1851–57.
100. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
101. Id. at 513–14.
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construction workers, janitors, maintenance crews, railway workers,
and farmers, among other skilled and unskilled laborers.102
Following the idea of double dissociation utilized in our earlier
work,103 we examined instances of “work”104 as a variation of “labor”
to see whether statutory language indeed covered a broader concept of
employment-related activity using a term other than “labor.”105
Interestingly, the use of “work” in USSL follows a pattern similar to
that found with the variants of “labor or service” noted above.106
“Work” begins to appear in these statutes around 1910 and increases
dramatically in the 1930s to 1950s. In such cases, it is almost
exclusively modified and used to refer to construction or government
work (e.g., work that is “electrical,” “mechanical,” “road,”
“sanitation,” “repair,” “construction,” and “street-cleaning”). For
example:
•

•

52 Stat. 156 (1938): All apportionments of
appropriations for the use of the municipal architect
in payment of personal services employed on
construction work provided for by said
appropriations shall be based on an amount not
exceeding 3 per centum of a total of not more than
$2,000,000 of appropriations made for such
construction projects . . . .
56 Stat. 424 (1942): That the services of draftsmen,
assistant engineers, levelers, transitmen, rodmen,
chainmen, computers, copyists, overseers, and
inspectors temporarily required in connection with
sewer, water, street, street-cleaning, or road
work, or construction and repair of buildings and
bridges, or any general or special engineering or

102. See Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1855 n.94.
103. Solan & Gales, supra note 41, at 1351–54.
104. See infra Part IV. Instances not related to the “labor” meaning (e.g., “a work of art” or “copyright
works”) were excluded.
105. See infra Part IV.
106. See supra Part III.
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construction work authorized by appropriations
may be employed exclusively to carry into effect said
appropriations when specifically and in writing
ordered by the Commissioners . . . .
These shifts in form and application are likely not arbitrary.
Linguistic research has shown that some expressions, based on their
social, cultural, or historical contexts, take on what is called semantic
prosody, that is positive or negative connotations that are not typically
included in dictionary definitions.107 In the case of “labor or service,”
the origin and use of the phrase in statutory language were associated
with slavery—a concept with extremely negative meaning.108 As
society shifted views and practices, what appears to have been a term
of art that was associated with negative practices came to be altered,
perhaps lessening the negative prosody. As society entered the era of
the Civil Conservation Corps and similar projects, focus was on work
and more positive forms of labor. Statutes passed during these decades,
such as the Railway Labor Act, reflect this shift to a more positive
attitude toward labor and work, whether manual or not.
IV. “Labor or Service” in Ordinary Speech
A. Changes in Meaning over Time
It is also possible to investigate the extent to which “labor or
service” was used as a single construction by examining corpora of
ordinary usage during the relevant periods and drawing inferences
from the context in which the expression is used. In this case, we
searched for the phrase in COHA, which covers the time period from
1810–2010, and COCA, which covers the period from 1990–2017.109

107. Michael Stubbs, Quantitative Data on Multi-Word Sequences in English: The Case of the Word
World, in TEXT, DISCOURSE AND CORPORA: THEORY AND ANALYSIS 163, 178 (Michael Hoey et al. eds.,
2007).
108. See Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1852.
109. COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69 (search “labo*r or service”).
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In COHA, there were fourteen instances of the exact phrase “labor
or service”.110 Ten referred to slaves or the work performed by slaves,
one referred to the statute in question in this analysis, and three (two
of which are quoted below) referred to paid industrial labor (1873 and
1877) and domestic labor (1954):
•

•

1873 (MAG):111 To keep the value of money
uniform, the rate of interest must be kept uniform.
Then it will distribute products equitably, according
to the labor or service performed in their
production; and without violating any principle of
equity, restore to the industrial classes their natural
rights of which they are now deprived by the present
iniquitous system.
1954 (NEWS): Its administrative paragraph set forth
that any local law adopted by the city might contain
provisions for exempting all work by domestic
employes and? “for the exemption of any other
wages for work, labor or service paid // at a rate not
in excess e $1,200 per annum.”112

In COCA, there were only two instances of “labor or service,” both
of which referred to workers who held low-paying jobs. Specifically:
•

2000 (ACAD): many young adults with histories of
ED/BD tend to work only sporadically and hold
low-paying labor or service jobs with few if any
fringe benefits

110. COHA, supra note 69. This search does not include punctuation within or after the phrase. Other
search queries may yield additional results. For example, see the lemma search below where commas are
included in the results. Because they did not greatly alter the frequencies or content in any category, they
were not included in the basic searches.
111. Id. Abbreviations for registers used in COHA refer to Fiction (FIC), Magazine (MAG), Newspaper
(NEWS), and Non-Fiction Books (NF); abbreviations in COCA refer to Fiction (FIC), Magazine (MAG),
Newspaper (NEWS), Academic (ACAD), and Spoken (SPOK). See ENGLISH-CORPORA.ORG,
https://www.english-corpora.org/, for a more detailed description of the texts in each register.
112. COHA, supra note 69. Non-standard spellings and errors are included from the original. Bolding
added for emphasis.
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2014 (ACAD): 75% of Mexican immigrant mothers
had less than a high school education, 79% worked
in labor or service jobs, and 70% were below the
poverty line.

These findings are further amplified by a search on the phase in
Google’s Ngram viewer, which provides general usage of words or
terms over time based on searches of books, documents, and reports.
Figure 1: Google Books Ngrams for “labor or service”

A closer look at the materials that reference “labor or service”
during the height of use (approximately 1840–1900) provided results
that were either official government documents or records, or
historical works referring to such documents or records. For example:
•
•
•

Labor Laws of the United States (1896)
Special Report of the Commissioner of Labor (1896)
The Story of Manual Labor in All Lands and Ages
(1886)

When looking at the few texts in the more contemporary period
(1960–2000), books and documents that used the phrase were similarly
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nonfiction texts about historical laws, government labor bulletins, and
legal documents. For example:
•
•
•

The Black Laws in the Old Northwest (1993)
Bulletin of the United States Bureau of Labor
Statistics (1967)
Labor-management relations in the public service
(1970)

Given the infrequent use of “labor or service” in COHA, COCA, and
Google Books to refer to much other than the original statutes or
historical government publications, we then examined lemmas,113 or
word forms, of the noun “labor” collocating with the noun “service”
in the two time periods to investigate other ways the two terms were
being used in proximity to each other. Our goal was to see whether
ordinary language also reflected the shift in usage over time in
statutory language. Looking only at the statutory term, “labor or
service,” is not sufficient to answer this question.
In COHA, there were 257 results, and in COCA, there were 129.114
A random sample of 100 was taken from each corpus for further
analysis.115 In COHA, there were approximately twelve instances that
referred to the original statute and used the exact phrase “labor or
service”; however, the majority of results used variations of the
original phrase and moved away from references to slaves or slave-like
labor. Interestingly, these variations precede similar variations found
in USSL, which did not appear until later, around the time of the
Railway Labor Act in 1926.116 Specifically, in COHA in the 1880s,
“labor or service” is more frequently pluralized (e.g., “labor or
services”), conjoined (e.g., “labor and service(s)”), and modified (e.g.,
“contract labor and civil service” or “camp labor and military
113. See, e.g., COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69. Lemma searches include all variants of a
word—e.g., labor, labors, labour, etc. Lemma searches are represented in the text by CAPS.
114. COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69 (search “LABOR_nn* and SERVICE_nn* +/-3”;
collocates).
115. COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69. Instances in each search that referred to names of
labor organizations, government services, or other related agencies were excluded from the analysis.
116. COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69.
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service”). And while some instances still refer to indentured-style
labor, references also start to include more voluntary, contract-based
manual employment. For example:
•

•

1888 (MAG): Besides this assault upon Mr.
Cleveland and the Democracy, there is little else in
General Harrison’s letter, except some assurances
that, while he was in the Senate, he gave votes that
approved the declarations in the Republican platform
on the subject of contract labor and civil
service reform.
1897 (MAG): There are others where such a period
is prescribed, in the absence of contract, as to general
industrial or mechanical labor; that is, to labor by the
day, and not to farm labor or domestic service.

In COCA, there are a few instances referring to the “fugitive slave
clause”; however, as compared to COHA, COCA provides even more
instances of conjoined or modified versions of “labor or service” and
refers to a much broader range of employment—from physical to
mental. For example:
•

•

•
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2011 (MAG): Many in labor and service who do
belong to a union still benefit from the efforts of the
union to increase wages and benefits, as well as to
improve working conditions and social conditions.
2016 (ACAD): The estimated cost of the entire
project was about $1 million, though the vast
majority of labor, services, and materials was
donated.
2017 (ACAD): “the Supreme Court . . . interpreted
the FLSA to mean that unpaid intern volunteers at
nonprofits are legal because such volunteers without
promise or expectation of compensation, but solely
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for their own pleasure, labor in the service of a
cause that they believe in.”
COCA shows that apart from references to the original statute, when
contemporary writers use the terms “labor” and “service” to refer to
slave-like duties, those instances are now modified. For instance:
•

•

1998 (MAG): The sagging fortunes of the Canadian
dollar may also help explain the sudden appeal of
Cuba as a holiday destination; with virtual
slave labor to provide services, package tours to
Castro’s island are significantly cheaper than similar
excursions to Florida or other Caribbean venues.
2003 (ACAD): The UN protocol specifically
addresses the trade in human beings for purposes of
prostitution and other forms of sexual exploitation,
forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar
to slavery, servitude, and the removal of organs.

Thus, the evidence points to the fact that “labor or service” has been
used as a term of art to describe manual, often nonvoluntary,
work-related activities both in the past and in the present.117
Modifications of the term—beginning in the early time period and
more commonly used today—expand the usage to refer to paid
employment that is frequently physical, but may also possess a mental
aspect, as described in the timeline below.
“Labor or Service” Timeline
•

USSL 1780s–1860s: Fixed phrase used to refer to
slaves, indentured servants, or others who perform
forced manual labor.
Compare COHA/COCA 1800s–2010s: Overall, the
majority of instances of the fixed phrase “labor or

117. Also highlighted in the timeline is the fact that use of the terms in the language of ordinary citizens
allowed for a broader range of meanings earlier than in statutory language across all time periods.
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service” referred to the statutes under discussion. In
COHA 1870s: The fixed phrase “labor or service”
first used to refer to manual labor as a chosen
profession.

Published by Reading Room,

•

USSL 1880s–1900s: Fixed phrase used to refer to
aliens, foreigners, and contract day laborers who
perform manual (mostly forced or low-paid
temporary) labor.
Compare COHA 1880s: Variations of “labor or
service” begin to occur with increased applications
for voluntary and/or permanent employment.

•

USSL 1910s–1920s: Variations of “labor or service”
begin to occur with mixed applications to apply to
forced and voluntary “labor”. “Work” also begins to
appear to refer to paid manual labor of government
workers and contractors.
Compare COHA/COCA 1800s–2010s: “Work”
appears throughout the time periods to refer to all
meanings of “labor” (slave-like, forced, temporary,
voluntary, permanent, etc.).

•

USSL 1920s–2000s: Variations of “labor or service”
refer to workers or employees who perform mostly
manual, voluntary paid labor.
Compare COCA 1900s–present: Voluntary, paid
labor (whether manual or mental) is the default use
of “labor” and “service.” And in COCA 1990s–
present: References to the original slave-like
“labor” and “service” are now the modified (i.e.,
marked) variations.
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Note again that the statute at issue in this case contained the term
modified by “of any kind,” but it appears that “labor or service” has
only more recently been modified to take on the broader sense.
B. What People Mean When They Use “Labor”
Since the Court focused on “labor” individually, we investigated
that term further in relation to what “labor” means, who “labors,” and
if those findings could apply to the activities that “clergy” perform.
This portion of the analysis investigates two time periods and
corpora: COHA (1880–1899), which covers the historic period in
which the statute was enacted and challenged, and COCA (2010–
2017), which provides a contemporary comparison of the terms,
presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Time Periods and Corpora Investigated
Statute: 1885
Decision: 1892
Contemporary: 2018

COHA: 1880–1889
COHA: 1890–1899
COCA: 2010–2017

1. What Does “Labor” Mean?
Merriam Webster provides a definition of the noun “labor”118 as
consisting of activities requiring physical or mental effort.119
Definitions include, for example:
•

expenditure of physical or mental effort especially
when difficult or compulsory (e.g., was sentenced to
six months at hard labor)120

118. Labor, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/labor
[https://perma.cc/P9GT-ZJHG] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).
119. Id.
120. Id.
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human activity that provides the goods or services in
an economy121
an economic group comprising those who do manual
labor or work for wages122
workers available for employment (e.g., Immigrants
provided a source of cheap labor).123

Yet, the examples and synonyms presented highlight the physical
aspects of the term (e.g., “grind, slavery, sweat, toil”) over the mental
aspects. 124
An examination of adjectives collocating with “LABOR” in COHA
and COCA also highlight the physical or manual aspects of “labor”
with “manual” and “hard” occurring in the first two positions in both
corpora, as shown in Table 2 below.
Table 2: Top Ten Adjectives125 Collocating with “labor”126
COHA: 1880–1899
Manual
Hard
Organized
Skilled
Productive
Unskilled

Raw
Freq.
104
92
33
32
31
25

COCA: 2010–2017
Manual
Hard
Cheap
Organized
Forced
Fair127

Raw
Freq.
134
128
118
101
96
59

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Labor, supra note 118.
125. COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69. “Central” was excluded from COHA since it referred
only to the name of a particular union, and “immaterial” and “national” were excluded from COCA since
the examples were only from a single publication and the name of a single organization, respectively.
These examples further demonstrate the need to examine context when performing such analyses.
126. COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69 (search “LABOR and _j* +3”; collocates, MI = 3 or
higher).
127. COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69. Instances of “fair” were almost exclusively used in
reference to “fair labor associations” or “fair labor standards,” which further emphasize manual or
physical labor, but also refer to hourly workers, more generally, with the “Fair Labor Standards Act.”
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Cheap
Arduous
Honest
Patient

24
22
21
18

Physical
Skilled
Agricultural
Environmental

46
44
23
22

Other collocates such as “arduous,” “forced,” and “physical” further
emphasize the physical aspect of the term and a keyword in context
(KWIC) examination of “organized,” “unskilled,” “cheap,” “honest,”
and “agricultural” provide additional instances of physical or manual
labor, as in the following examples:
•

•

•

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss5/7

1884 (MAG): It is one of the delusions that still abide
in too many minds that the great industrial need of
the South is cheap and unskilled labor, the toil of an
ignorant peasantry.
1882 (MAG): The cultivation of tobacco on a great
scale required immense plantations and an
abundance of cheap labor; and as among the white
immigrants cheap labor was not forth-coming in
sufficient quantity, recourse was at once had to the
slave-trade.
1882 (MAG): He is quick to perceive that, while
“honest labor” dignifies the laborer because it is
honest, it is not more dignified or honest because
unintelligent, or such as can be performed as well by
a steam-engine or a horse. It can not be questioned
that it is precisely this aspect of farming—its
supposed necessary association with hard,
unintelligent, merely mechanical labor, unrelieved
by any considerable use of the intellect - that has in
the past caused it to be looked down upon as a pursuit
unworthy of educated and intellectual men . . . .
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In COHA, one of the adjectival collocates—“skilled”—was used in
reference to both physical and mental aspects of “labor,” as in the
following examples:
•

•

1890 (MAG): With our productive machinery, with
the inventive genius of our people constantly in
advance of the world, with our cheap and skilled
labor, we can produce, cheaper and better, more than
half the products which the manufacturing people of
Europe are distributing through the world, if we
could obtain the materials at the same cost.
1881 (MAG): Artistic labor, skilled labor, that
which is done with the least waste of mental and
bodily vigor, and accompanied with the highest
wages, is that which best develops the individual for
the advantage of society.

The collocate “patient” in COHA was the only term that more often
referenced the mental aspect of “labor,” typically in an educational
setting, as in the following example:
•

1892 (MAG): All science indeed has come to exist
through the patient labors of students who have
slowly done the work of unravelling the tangled web
of interlaced actions, some part of which in turn each
faithful inquirer must with the teacher’s aid repeat.

The results from COHA and COCA demonstrate that while “labor”
can be a mental activity, it is most often applied to contexts wherein
physical or manual labor is occurring.
All of this suggests that by the end of the nineteenth century, when
the law was enacted and the case arose, the scope of “labor” had grown
to include more than slave-like labor, and, at the margins, more than
work that required physical exertion.
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2. Who “Labors”?
When examining who performs “labor” in COHA and COCA, the
majority of results can be grouped into two main semantic categories:
(1) collocates that refer to working-class, forced, or slave-like workers
(e.g., “slave,” “pauper,” “convict,” “agitators,” “child,” and
“migrant”), and (2) collective noun collocates that refer to laborers as
impersonal mass units (e.g., “class,” “ranks,” “market,” “supply,” and
“pool”). As seen in Table 3, many terms possess both semantic
qualities.
Table 3: Top Ten Collocate Nouns128 Describing Those Who Perform
“labor”129
COHA: 1880–1899
Classes
Slave
Market
Prison
Pauper
Ranks
Poverty
Convict
Agitators
Missionary

Raw
Freq.
84
23
30
19
18
13
13
11
10
10

COCA: 2010–2017
Market
Force
Child
Slave
Markets
Farm
Supply
Pool
Migrant
Migration

Raw
Freq.
585
525
154
90
81
45
41
34
31
29

128. COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69. There were other nouns collocating with “LABOR”
such as “capital”, “hours”, and “problem”; collective nouns referring to entities that organize or manage
laborers such as “union”, “federation”, and “bureau”; and proper titles and names of such organizations
such as “secretary”, “division”, and “Knights”, but only those related to people who perform labor were
included in this table. Id. Additionally, “day” was excluded from COCA since the context revealed its use
almost exclusively referred to the holiday “Labor Day” and not “day laborers”, providing further support
for a close contextual examination of the data. Id.
129. COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69 (search “LABOR and _nn* +/-3”; collocates, MI =
3 or higher).
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Examples from category 1—working-class, forced, or slave-like
workers—include:
•

•

1892 (NEWS): A bill designed to prevent the
employment on public works of prison or convict
labor or the products of such labor was reported to
the House to-day from the Labor Committee by
Representative Davis . . .
1892 (NF): Large numbers of the alien laborers who
are coming now, are little better than “slaves of
contractors, steamship lines, and the professional
European jobbers in pauper labor . . .

Examples from category 2—collective nouns referring to laborers
as impersonal mass units—include:
•

•

1883 (MAG): It is not for the protection of the rich,
but of the middle and less favored or manual labor
classes, that public expenditure should be carefully
guarded.
2014 (NEWS): But in all seriousness, in Washington
right now, the labor pool hasn’t caught up with the
boom. It’s a real problem for hiring in restaurants, let
alone in the government.

Other nouns on the collocation list with “labor” related to qualities
of those who “labor.” In most instances, the terms provided a negative
prosody with respect to “laborers.” Negative terms included
“problem,” “expense,” “troubles,” “disputes,” and “imprisonment.”
The collocates that provided neutral or positive semantic prosody (e.g.,
“cost,” “products,” and “fruits”) did not reference the “laborers,” but
the benefits received by the employers of the laborers.
The one term that appeared to reference a positive quality of
“laborers” was “dignity.” However, upon further examination, the
structure of each sentence carried negative connotations given the

Published by Reading Room,

35

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 5 [], Art. 7

526

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:Spec. Issue

context of use. For example (italics added for emphasis of the
negativity):
•
•

1880 (MAG): The words spoken about the dignity of
labor are not apt to be very sincere.
1887 (FIC): to talk of dignity attaching to labor of
any sort under the system then prevailing was
absurd.

Thus, despite the fact that dictionary definitions of “labor” do not
mark the term with a positive or negative meaning, as speakers of a
language, we tend to utilize words in a way that is shared by our
community.130 In this case, the underlying tendency to frame “labor”
in a negative manner may have additionally played a role in the Court’s
decision to treat the activities of “clergy” as outside of the definition
of “labor.”131 The way in which clergy were described as “brain
toilers” suggests a conceptual distinction between laborers and the
clergy132 as is further exemplified by this example that juxtaposes
“clergymen,” who are of “professional classes,” with the “laboring
classes”:133
•

1880 (MAG): the professional classes have less
bodily strength than the laboring classes, and that
clergymen, in particular, are weak in the arm of flesh.

Finally, we found an earlier exception from one magazine. A search
for synonyms of “clergy” with collocates of “LABOR” resulted in
three instances of “laboring clergy”134 from the 1830s and described
130. Joanna Channell, Corpus-Based Analysis of Evaluative Lexis, in EVALUATION IN TEXT:
AUTHORIAL STANCE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF DISCOURSE 38, 38–55 (Susan Hunston & Geoff
Thompson eds., 2000).
131. Id.
132. See Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 464 (1892) (“It was never suggested that
we had in this country a surplus of brain toilers, and, least of all, that the market for the services of
Christian ministers was depressed by foreign competition.”).
133. COHA, supra note 69.
134. Id. (search “=clergy and LABOR +/-3”; collocates, MI = 3 or higher). The remaining results
primarily referred to the UK Labor Ministry or Ministry of Labor, which were excluded.
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“clergy” who were “the teachers of religion” as opposed to the
“bishops and archbishops” who led the religious institutions.
•

•

1832 (MAG): But whether it will be thought just, by
the reformed Parliament, giving effect to the popular
sense, to assess on the owner of the land the whole
cost of supporting the teachers of religion,—which is
the effect of the present system,—we do not pretend
to say. That something will be done, and that
speedily, with the Church, seems to be understood. It
appears to be admitted, even on the present system,
that its revenues require a new apportionment
between the dignitaries and the laboring clergy.
1835 (MAG): The average salaries paid to the
bishops and archbishops exceed twenty-five
thousand dollars a year, and some of them receive as
much as a hundred thousand dollars; while a
numerous class of the clergy, the laboring
clergy too, are obliged to content themselves with a
scanty subsistence.

Because these were the only examples we found and they were from
the same magazine (North American Review: Reform in England), we
regard them as outliers.
Thus, while there are instances in COCA of mental labor, as noted
above, “labor” in both COHA and COCA appear to primarily relate to
physical labor—oftentimes seen as an impersonal, yet organized,
mass—and are referenced in a negative manner. The few instances that
reference clergy juxtapose their work from that of “laborers” in both
class and mental effort.
3. What Do Clergy Do?
In order to examine more closely what actions “clergy” perform, we
investigated verbs that collocate with “clergy,” as seen in Table 4.
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Table 4: Top Ten Verbs135 Collocating with “clergy”136
COHA: 1880–1899
Opposed
Bore
Accepted
Attended
Announced
Represented
Arrogated
Denouncing
Strained
Deprived

Raw
Freq.
4
4
4
3
3
3
2
2
2
2

COCA: 2010–2017
Founded
Estimates
Declared
Ordained
Marry
Denied
Refused
Exercised
Banned
Blamed

Raw
Freq.
8
8
6
5
5
5
5
4
4
4

The verbs on these lists—both in COHA and COCA—primarily
reflect activities that are cognitive or communicative in nature and use.
For example:
•

•

1887 (NF): [A]s a whole, the priesthood accepted,
without any effective protest, the fires of the Council
of Constance which consumed Huss, and the
abominations of the Borgias at Rome.
1898 (NF): The Federalist clergy joined in
denouncing Jefferson on the ground that he was an
atheist.

135. COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69. Instances of “changed,” “formed,” and “resigned”
were excluded from the COHA list since they almost exclusively referred to UK government officials
(“the ministry”) as opposed to religious leaders. In COCA, “issued,” “announced,” “estimates,” and
“oversees” were excluded for similar reasons (i.e., foreign government ministries). It should be noted that
in some of the other instances in both COHA and COCA, government ministries are referenced as well,
but the verbs also frequently relate to activities performed by religious leaders, so they were included here
for illustrative purposes.
136. COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69 (search “=clergy and _v* -3”; collocates, MI = 3 or
higher).
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2010 (NEWS): Experts who study Christian
ministries said that whatever the reason for it, Dr.
Dobson’s decision was extraordinary. # “I can’t
think of another example where the leader of a major
ministry organization founded it, built it up, then
moved on and did something so visibly competitive,”
said Stewart M. Hoover, director of the Center for
Media, Religion and Culture at the University of
Colorado, Boulder.
2013 (MAG): One ministry declared simply:
“Adoption is the new pregnant.” # All of this
enthusiasm has created an army of advocates rallying
to revive an international adoption business that has
been on the wane since 2004, and has reoriented the
industry in a more overtly religious direction.

These results demonstrate that the primary functions of “clergy” are
not manual, indentured-like labor, but activities that require more
cognitive duties such as “denouncing,” “declaring,” and “opposing.”
Finally, since few collocations between “clergy” and “LABOR”
were found in the previous section describing who labors, we
examined “work” as a common synonym of “labor” from the statutory
corpus in connection to activities performed by “clergy.” In both
corpora, examples were similar to the other activities performed by
“clergy”—i.e., those that are more representative of “work” that is
spiritual or mental in nature. For example:
•
•

Published by Reading Room,

1886 (MAG): the priesthood could work miracles
2014 (MAG): As he explained his work with a
prison ministry in Texas, I found myself surprised
and asked why he was involved. He said, “More than
a decade ago, I realized that when Jesus tells us to
feed the hungry, cloth the naked, and visit the
prisoner, he actually means it.”
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•

2013 (MAG): Most important, he believes ministry
leaders must work from a place of love.

Interestingly, in light of how the statute was interpreted, “service”
was mostly left out of consideration in the opinion. The same
dictionary previously cited defines the noun “service” as including
features related to employment as well as the act of doing something
positive for another person.137 For example:
•
•
•
•
•
•

the occupation or function of serving (e.g., in active
service)
employment as a servant (e.g., entered his service)
contribution to the welfare of others (e.g., glad to be
of service)
a meeting for worship—often used in plural (e.g.,
held evening services)
the act of serving, such as a helpful act (e.g., did him
a service)
useful labor that does not produce a tangible
commodity—usually used in plural (e.g., charge for
professional services)

The senses of “service” are mixed between activities related to being
in servitude and providing something of helpful service, which, given
the corpus findings above, could clearly relate to the activities of the
“clergy.”
An investigation in the two relevant time periods of the collocates
“clergy” (and its synonyms) and “SERVICE” produced a few hits: five
in COHA and twenty-five in COCA.138 For example:

137. Service,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/service
[https://perma.cc/2J3M-V6A9] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).
138. COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69 (search “=clergy and SERVICE +/-4”; collocates).
This number increases to twenty-four in COHA and sixty-nine in COCA with the search: “=clergy and
=service +/-4”; collocates. This includes collocates such as “assistance,” “benefit,” and “help” in both
corpora, which further describe the spiritual, nonmanual work the “clergy” provide.
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1882 (MAG): FOR a while after his reception, Mr.
Newman proposed to devote himself to some secular
calling, but Cardinal Wiseman, in whose hands he
had placed himself decided otherwise; and, indeed, it
must have been obvious to all the leading members
of the church which now had gained him that so great
gifts of preaching, such deep theological // learning,
so keen a power of analyzing the workings of the
human heart, should be available for the service of
the priesthood.
1892 (MAG): Arthur Brooks, now rector of the
Church of the Incarnation in New York City, and the
Rev. John Cotton Brooks, now rector of Christ
Church, Springfield, and also of his other brother, the
late Frederick Brooks, who died while rector of St.
Paul’s Church, Cleveland, and who gave abundant
promise of a brilliant and successful service in the
Episcopal ministry.
2011 (MAG): I encourage you to pursue your
important ministry in the service of the church,
sustained by the vigilant attention of your bishop and
the unending prayers of the Christian community.
2016 (MAG): The ministry offers an uncommon
service, given that white-collar criminals and their
families have little social support other than online
forums.

Given the instances provided above, the outcome of Holy Trinity
Church may have been decided differently if the Court had
investigated the meaning and use of “service” when collocated with
the “work” “clergy” perform. Yet, as we tried to demonstrate above,
the phrase “labor or service” had its own meaning in statutory
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language, and a negative connotation that went beyond the meanings
of the individual terms.139
SUMMARY
Analysis of data from USSL, COHA, COCA, and Google Books
suggests the following facts:
•

•

“Labor or Service” in either order was used through
most of the nineteenth century to refer to manual,
slave-like labor.
In legal contexts, the expression was used to
specifically characterize slaves themselves.
Article IV of the Constitution contains a fugitive
slave provision that uses exactly that language, and
the Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850 do so as
well, as do other statutes from that era.

It is therefore not clear whether to consider “labor or service” as a
single construction meaning the type of work that slaves perform or as
an ordinary compound disjunctive noun phrase. That is, one can ask
either about the expression “labor or service” or about “labor” and
“service” separately. The Court seemed to choose the latter course,
although we argue here that the former course may have been more
faithful to the meaning of the term as understood at the time based on
the following:
•

When the activities of clergy were represented in the
corpora, “labor” was rarely used other than in “labor
of the Lord” and similar expressions. Yet, while rare,
the corpus demonstrated occasional use of “labor” in
connection with the tasks that members of the clergy
performed.

139. COCA, supra note 63; COHA, supra note 69.
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When the corpora demonstrated that clergy perform
a “service,” it was either in the sense of being “in the
service of the lord” or providing a positive “service”
to the community. However, the decision placed
more focus on the former term—“labor”—than on
the latter—“service.”

It appears to us that the Court got the ordinary meaning argument
correct based on corpus analysis: The statute could be construed to
apply to a member of the clergy hired under contract by a church, but
it would be an outlying use of the language, notwithstanding the fact
that the statute includes “labor or service of any kind.” As for concern
about the clergy not being listed among the exceptions, the argument
may not be as strong as it initially seemed, but we certainly do not
claim it to be irrelevant. Thus, we take no stand on the Supreme
Court’s actual holding, but the history of usage in both statutory and
ordinary language do support the Court’s decision.
Returning to the discussion at the start of this article, we have
attempted to strengthen the use of corpus linguistic analysis by relying
on doubly dissociated terms, such as “labor” and “clergy,” highlighting
the value of creating or consulting specialized corpora to investigate
whether the statutory language reflects ordinary usage or carries a
specialized legal meaning, and exploring inferences that can be drawn
from collocational information in addition to the frequency of word
usage. Our goal has been to demonstrate how corpus analysis can be
of help in exploring historical cases, for which introspection about
meaning is unavailable.
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